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Abstract—With the increasing availability of smart handsets,
the mobile phone is likely to become the device of choice for
accessing sophisticated services and applications in a convenient
yet secure manner. This is especially true with the introduction
of Near Field Communication (NFC), which provides the phone
with an interface allowing it to act as a smart card reader or
to emulate smart cards. However the user registration process
is relatively weak for access to mobile communication services
and some third party application providers have concerns when
security certification is totally reliant on the trust and processes
of the mobile network operator. In contrast, the Citizen Digital
Certificate (CDC) is a PKI based citizen identification card issued
to a user by the government, following a rigorous user registration
process. In our investigation we explore the combined use of NFC
phones and the CDC card, by using the government card to
endorse the security of credentials held within the NFC Security
Element that is hosted within the phone’s Subscriber Identity
Module (SIM). In this paper, we propose and describe a secure
mobile payment system solution for use in a traditional in-store
environment, which combines the CDC PKI, the NFC secure
element within the SIM and a 3G mobile network. Moreover, the
solution provides a convenient user experience, which leverages
from the wide-scale 3G network and the short-range contactless
communication of NFC, and could replace the use of payment
or service specific smart cards.
I. INTRODUCTION
A very common way of allowing users to make non cash
payments is to issue them with a smart card. The number of
issued physical cards has been steadily increasing in recent
years and many people have multiple debit, credit cards and
transport cards. To address this, some bank cards are already
issuing multi-purpose cards, e.g. the Oyster card and payWave
variant of credit cards issued by Barclay in the UK. Combining
banking and transport functionality in a secure manner has
some notable advantages, e.g. a user can have the e-cash
functionality of a transport card and use the bank credentials
for top-up whenever the credit runs low. [1]
The above example serves to illustrate that an alternative
to simply issuing more and more smart cards is desirable and
that a solution may benefit from combination of multiple tech-
nologies and legacy systems. In this paper the combination of
the multiple technologies: Near Field Communication (NFC),
Secure Element-SIM (SE-SIM) and Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI), are used with mobile communication and CDC legacy
systems to construct an m-payment system.
NFC in addition with SE-SIM provides strong crypto-
graphic calculation power and proximity communication be-
tween compatible devices. It offers good security, yet an
easy intuitive user experience and ubiquitous mobile access
to users’ payment accounts and credit. The functionality may
also be securely managed via the mature and well standardised
telecommunication infrastructure of the mobile network oper-
ator (MNO). PKI, apart from its slow speed of calculation on
limited resource devices, offers strong security and verifiable
digital signatures without the key distribution problems of
symmetric solutions. How to combine the best features of
these existing technologies (and associated legacy systems)
and construct a secure and easy to use in-store payment
system, is the main goal of this work.
A number of m-payment studies have been published in
recent years. Most of them utilise technologies such as GPRS
[18], SMS [19], bluetooth [21] [22], WAP [23] [24] and so
on, to interact with mobile phones for m-payment transactions.
However, most of the aforementioned approaches are designed
for online web payment transaction [4], and have security
and ease-of-use restrictions that limit user acceptance. Other
weaknesses relate to Internet connection speed or SMS latency,
which result in lengthy set-up and transaction times. There is
less literature related to conventional (shop based) payment
transaction scenarios [2] [3], which will be the focus for this
work.
Two phases are defined in the proposed payment transaction;
the user registration (endorsed registration) phase and the ac-
tual payment execution phase. Registration is only performed
once and relies on a prior trust relationship of both the MNO
and the user with a third party Certification Authority (CA).
In particular, the CA is the government entity that issued the
user’s CDC card. The MNO trust relationship with the CA
permits a mobile enabled transaction to be associated with the
strong user identity registration of the CDC card.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Near Field Communication (NFC)
NFC is specified in ISO/IEC 18092 [5] and is a short-range
wireless interface with data exchange rates up to 424Kbps
and an operating frequency of 13.56 MHz. NFC offers three
main operation modes for various types of applications: card
(smart card/RFID) emulation mode, card reader mode and
peer-to-peer mode. NFC is an extension of the ISO/IEC 14443
Type A [6] and Felica [7] specifications and NFC is therefore
compatible with these systems. ISO/IEC 21481 describes
extended services for NFC, which includes the possible use of
existing ISO 14443 Type B and ISO/IEC 15693 [8] products.
The main application areas are payment/transaction, ticketing,
access control, connectivity, information download and loyalty
[9]. The application types could be roughly classified into four
groups: touch-and-go, touch-and-confirm, touch-and-connect
and touch-and-explore [10]. The NFC secure element (SE),
which contains secure program memory and key material,
could be a device embedded into the mobile phone or be
integrated into the UICC (platform that hosts the SIM). The
Single Wire Protocol (SWP) supports SIM-centric solutions
and allows for connections between the UICC card and an
NFC wireless modem chip in the handset [9] [11]. For detailed
NFC security analysis please refer to [12] and [13].
B. Citizen Digital Certificate (CDC)
The Citizen Digital Certificate is a natural person certificate
based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), mainly for assisting
the government in solving problems associated with offer-
ing electronic services on the Internet. These problems are
difficulty of verifying the online user identity and ensuring
the security of online data transmission. The main purposes
of having this government PKI (GPKI) are offering a good
government information security on the Internet, providing
integrity and non-repudiation features on each transaction,
simplifying government administrative processes (physically
and electronically), and upgrading services to be more efficient
for both the government agencies and citizens.
Functions of the CDC include: (1) Identification Verifi-
cation: During any kind of online process when identity
verification is needed, CDC IC card can be used instead of
inserting user name and password. (2) Encryption: Information
is encrypted; the information being transmitted is protected
from the danger of interception and disclosure. (3) Signature:
According to E-Signature law no. 9, and with the agreement
of the signer, his/her signature can be transformed into an
E-Signature. When an electronic file is combined with an
electronic signature, it is viewed as a legal document and has
the same authority as a paper document with governmental
seal. Therefore, the original paper document can be legally
replaced by the electronic document. (4) Electronic Certificate:
Paper certificates from different agencies can be changed into
electronic form by using the Citizen Digital Certificate.
Some use cases of CDC include: Internet tax return filing,
health insurance personal data and fine inquiry, electronic
motor vehicle and driver licence information management,
digital household registration and ID loss reporting. For more
information please refer to [14] [15] [16] [17].
III. NFC M-PAYMENT SYSTEM WITH CDC
We assume that a customer wishes to perform a mobile
payment transaction while shopping within a conventional
TABLE I
ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTATIONS
AuC Authentication Centre
CDC Citizen Digital Certificate
Cer Certificate
D() Decryption
DT Date and Time
E() Encryption
EC Endorsed Credential
ED Expiry Date
GEN Self Key Generation Command from MNO
GCA Government Certificate Authority
ID Identity/serial number of the smart card
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
KAPP Application Key between SE-SIM and CDC
MAC Message Authentication Code
MNO Mobile Network Operator
MP Mobile Payment
MSISDN Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number (phone number)
MSK Shared key between MNO and SE-SIM
NFC Near Field Communication
OI Ordering Information
ON Ordering Number
PI Payment Information
PIREQ Payment Information Request
PK Public Key
POS Point of Sale
PR Payment Result
R Random Number
SE Secure Element
SigA(B) Signature of B which is signed by key A
SK Private Key
SN Serial Number
TC Transaction Counter
TL Transaction Limit
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
TP Total Price
TSN Transaction Number
USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
in-store environment (with a fixed line POS) and that the
customer is already registered for CDC i.e. CDC is a gov-
ernment issued certificate that works as a digital ID card. The
uniqueness of the CDC card card, the private-key and public-
key secure functionality, and the nation-wide acceptance and
validation are complimentary features for NFC phone (SE-
SIM) enabled mobile payment services. Please note that all
phone-based cryptographic calculations and confidential data
in the proposed solution are carried out and stored in the SE-
SIM.
In this section, a step-by-step description is given of the
combined CDC and NFC mobile payment system solution.
The m-payment transaction service is separated into two
phases: Endorsed Registration phase and the Payment Transac-
tion phase. Assumptions and requirements are presented before
each phase description. All the notations and abbreviations
used within the descriptions are provided in Table 1.
A. Phase 1: Endorsed Registration
Endorsed registration is the process of binding the mobile
transactional credentials with customer credentials certified by
a trusted third party. As Figure 1 depicts, three entities are used
in this phase: MNO/AuC, the customer’s NFC phone/SE-SIM
Fig. 1. NFC m-Payment with CDC – Endorsed Registration Phase
and the customer’s ID card, e.g. CDC. Here we use CDC as an
example in the system and assume both MNO and customer’s
CDC are under the same CA, i.e. the Government CA (GCA).
The GCA (which represents the trusted third party) is used to
verify the customer’s CDC, so that it can be used to endorse
the customer’s SE-SIM. The MNO works as a domain entity to
verify the mobile user’s phone and associated CDC. Because it
recognises the GCA it can check the authenticity of the CDC
provided by the customer and verify the Endorsed Credential
(EC) to generate a certificate for the SE-SIM (CerSE) for
later use in mobile payment transactions.
The customer NFC phone is a bridge for the MNO to
authenticate the CDC ID card and prove that transaction
information is backed by the CDC. The main job of the
CDC here is to generate the EC as a valid endorsement for
the customer phone when performing subsequent m-payment
transactions.
Some additional assumptions are necessary: (1) The MNO
has already cooperated with the GCA, which means the CDC
card would contain the public key of the MNO (PKMNO)
when it is issued to the user. (2) The MNO has pre-stored
its public key (PKMNO) and a “personalised” shared key
(MSK) on the SE-SIM. (3) The SE-SIM already has a
personalised secret key (SKSE) and public key (PKSE)
stored securely in non-volatile memory. (4) The mobile com-
munication channel between the MNO/AuC and the customer
NFC phone is secure. (5) The customer NFC phone has an
external smart card reader (or cradle) connected in order to
communicate with the customer’s ID card (CDC). (6) The
MNO can obtain the public key of the CDC via a channel
to the GCA. Note that assumption (5) is only required for
registration and would become unnecessary if future CDC
cards follow the market trend and also offer a contactless
interface.
The first step of endorsed registration is to forge a strong
legal binding between the “customer’s CDC” and “SE-SIM”
cards. In order to achieve this we use the customers’s CDC
private key (SKCDC) to sign the public key of the SE
(PKSE). An Endorsed Credential (EC) and a certificate of
the SE (CerSE) will be generated and utilised in the payment
transaction phase. For further detail on the binding generation
processes between the CDC and the SE-SIM please see the
protocol step descriptions.
Step 1 – 2: The customer first selects “register” from the
m-payment application on his mobile phone which triggers
generation of a random number, R1, and prompts the user to
insert the CDC into the reader.
Step 3: Here the ID number of the CDC card (IDCDC) is
sent to the customer’s phone.
Step 4 – 5: The customer’s NFC phone makes an m-
payment service request to the MNO. We assume there is a
secure channel between the MNO and the customer phone,
using the identity and security credentials that are pre-stored
in the SIM and known by the MNO. Furthermore, the MNO
has records of the phone’s IDSE and associated PKSE . By
sending the IDCDC to the MNO it is possible for the MNO
to check the validity of the CDC via the GCA and obtain the
associated public key (PKCDC).
Step 6: A random number, R1, is generated when the
check of step 5 is successful. The MNO produces a packet
of information including PKCDC , IDSE , PKSE , R1. A
signature is added using the MNO’s private key (SKMNO).
Step 7 –8: After the pack of information is received, the
NFC phone prompts the user to enter a PIN for the purpose of
user identification of the CDC card. The SE-SIM then forwards
a new pack of information to the CDC including the original
information IDSE , PKSE , R1, MNO’s signature in addition
with the PIN and another random number, R2, using the public
key of CDC sent from MNO and encrypted under it.
Step 9: The government issued ID card, CDC, decrypts the
received packet of information (PIN,R2, IDSE , PKSE , R1)
from the MNO. If the PIN check fails then the phone may
repeat step 8 allowing the customer to try again. If the PIN try
limit is reached (typically three attempts) then the transaction
terminates with an error message and customer guidance is
displayed via the phone. The significance is that the CDC
card may no longer be in possession of the legitimate holder.
If the PIN and signature are valid the CDC card increments
both R1 and R2, to reduce the risk of replay attack when
the values are used again. An Endorsed Credential (EC) is
generated here, which is a binding of NFC phone and CDC
information (IDSE , CerCDC , PKSE), that is signed by the
CDC. IDSE and PKSE are the two critical components for
identifying the SE-SIM. CerCDC and the signature of the
CDC provide a proof that these components are backed and
guaranteed by a legitimate government issued ID card. EC =
IDSE , PKSE , CerCDC , SigSKCDC(IDSE , PKSE , CerCDC ).
Step 10 – 11: The random numbers R1 + 1 and R2 + 1
are used by the MNO and SE-SIM respectively as tests of
freshness. R1+1 and R2+1 are encrypted by PKMNO and
PKSE respectively to provide confidentiality. The encrypted
random values and the EC are sent to the NFC phone.
Providing R2+1, is correct, the EC is stored in the SE-SIM.
Step 12 – 14: The encryption of R1 + 1 by PKMNO and
the EC are forwarded to the MNO for further authentication.
The MNO can decrypt R1 + 1. If the check on the returned
R1 + 1 is correct, it implies that the correct CDC card is
being used for registration this is still true as the value of R1
is correct. Furthermore, by checking the certificate of the CDC
(CerCDC) via the GCA’s Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
the MNO can determine if the CDC is still valid. After the
check of CerCDC and EC, a new certificate is created for
subsequent use in m-payment transactions. This certificate is
called the certificate of EC i.e. (CerEC) and it includes extra
customer account information and payment details associated
to this service, such as the certificate’s serial number (SN ),
expiry date (ED), transaction limits (TL) as well as PKSE ,
IDSE and IDCDC . All this information is signed by the
MNO’s private key (SKMNO).
Step 15 – 16: Finally the certificate of EC is sent back to
the NFC phone. If the signature is correct the information is
stored in the SE-SIM for use in the m-payment transactions.
B. Phase 2: NFC m-Payment Transaction
Given a successful endorsed registration from the previous
phase, the customer phone/SIM is now ready to perform
in-store m-payment transactions, in which a customer tries
to perform an in-store m-payment through the authentica-
tion/verification of the MNO (that is endorsed by the CDC).
On first entering the payment application, the phone shall
automatically display the expiry date of certificate EC to the
user, and payment actions will be restricted if CerEC is out of
date. The general payment process is that a customer presents
his phone close to the shop NFC POS, so the phone can present
CerEC for an ID authentication of its SE-SIM, and if the
check passes then EC is sent in addition with the payment
information.
The MNO should already have EC and CerEC from
the registration phase, and a personalised/unique secret key
(MSK) for the customer SE-SIM. There is no secret key
shared between the shop POS terminal and the customer
SE-SIM, thus the shop POS relies on the MNO to verify the
authenticity of the customer SE-SIM. The shop POS is able
to verify the MNO signatures as it has access to the public
key of the MNO (PKMNO).
Step 1 – 2: The shop NFC POS first scans barcodes/RFID
tags of the items to be purchased. The shop POS has a display
of the total price of this purchase. The customer holds his
phone close to the shop POS as the preferred method of
payment and receives ordering information (OI) from the
POS. The information includes the order number (ON ), total
price (TP ) and date/time of OI (DTOI ). A given date/time
of purchase is essential in any kind of payment transaction
record.
Step 3: In this step there is a design option, as the user
can be prompted for manual input e.g. a PIN, or alternatively
Fig. 2. NFC m-Payment with CDC – Payment Transaction Phase
the process could continue automatically for a faster/smoother
transaction. The manual check prevents misuse of lost or
stolen phones; whereas an automatic process can be faster and
more convenient for customers. By displaying total price, the
customer can be sure that the amount of money he would pay
is correct. The SE-SIM then generates a random number (R3)
that is used in subsequent authentication.
Step 4 – 5: The CerEC and R3 are encrypted under the
personalised key (MSK) between the MNO and the SE-SIM
and sent along with the Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number
(MSISDN ) (phone number) to the MNO, using the POS as
a simple pipe. Using IMSI instead of MSISDN for added
privacy is an option, however MSISDN is perhaps more
relevant to customers i.e. clearly indicates purchases made
with the phone. In any case, the account details can be linked
to the IMSI or MSISDN by the MNO, which means the
MNO should know the SE-SIM’s identity and the associated
certificate created during endorsed registration. The MNO
compares the received CerEC with the registration version
and checks for expiry before continuing with the process.
Step 6: The incremented R3 is encrypted under MSK and
sent back to the customer SE-SIM, using the POS and phone
as a simple pipe.
Step 7 – 8: If the check of the incremented random number
is correct, the SE-SIM can confirm that it is dealing with
messages from the genuine MNO. The SE-SIM then generates
payment information, PI = OI, TS, SigSKSE(OI, TS).
The time stamp (TS) is embedded here to keep the freshness
of the system. The customer SE-SIM signs OI and TS, to
prove that this binding data is authorised and legally issued
from the SE-SIM. In step 8, the PI and EC are encrypted
under MSK (to preserve privacy) and sent to the MNO.
Step 9: EC is checked first after the decryption of the
binding data from step 8. The MNO uses PKSE from within
EC for verifying the signature of the SE-SIM on the payment
information. At this stage, the MNO has confirmed the identity
of the customer and its signed PI . A check of time stamp (TS)
is necessary to ensure payment messages are sent within an
expected time, and a further check is made to ensure that the
total price (TP ) does not exceed the transaction limit (TL).
Step 10 – 11: After the verification of PI , the money is
deducted from the customer’s account. The MNO creates a
payment result PR for this transaction. The PR includes the
transaction number (TN ), payment information and date/time
of completed transaction, plus the MNO signature.
Step 12 – 14: The shop POS verifies the signature on
PR using its pre-stored MNO public key (PKMNO). It then
checks for the correct payment amount within OI . The POS
then displays the transaction result on its screen and prints an
itemised billing receipt (on paper). The customer phone also
receives PR and then independently verifies and displays the
transaction result. The same PR are expected to be shown on
the shop POS and the customer phone as the final step in the
transaction.
IV. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
A. Attack Scenarios
The protocol has been considered with respect to a number
of attack scenarios which are outlined in this section. Note that
RP and PP are used to indicate registration phase and payment
phase respectively.
1) (RP) The customer could present a stolen CDC card dur-
ing registration however the user PIN challenge would
prevent this from being useful. An invalidated or expired
CDC would also be detected by the MNO.
2) (RP) The use of the phone as a PIN entry device could
create a vulnerability if the code could be tampered with,
however the integrity of the phone application could be
secured via the cryptographic functionality of the SIM
card.
3) (RP) If the CDC to phone link could be eavesdropped
during a normal registration then an attacker may at-
tempt to discover the CDC PIN from the exchanged
messages. Registration is intended to happen in a trusted
environment although this cannot be completely guar-
anteed and the likelihood of attack increases if the
CDC evolves to a contactless interface. Therefore, the
protocol protects the transmitted PIN via encryption with
(PKCDC).
4) (RP) A dishonest customer could take a copy of the
legitimate EC and CerEC and store in a second phone,
however this should be of limited use as the original
phone’s SE (rather than that of the second phone) is
bound within the credentials.
5) (PP) A dishonest customer or shop-keeper might attempt
to send captured transaction credentials to try and charge
purchases to another account, however the signature on
new payment information will not be correct and the
timestamp will be invalid on an old payment signature.
6) (PP) During an m-payment transaction a customer or
shop-keeper might attempt to change the order infor-
mation and correct payment, however this information
is checked visually as well as within the transaction
protocol.
7) (PP) It is unlikely that the MNO would attempt fraud due
to the existing trust relationship with its customers; how-
ever customers would have some protection as legitimate
transactions are required to be associated with signed
payment information. This assumes that the SKSE only
exists within the SIM-SE.
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of the CDC Mobile Pay-
ment Scheme
Advantages: The benefits of the proposed protocol/system
are listed below.
1) The customer NFC phone has an endorsed transaction
credential (i.e. EC) stored in the SE-SIM, which is
backed by the strong registration processes of the gov-
ernment ID card that has national recognition.
2) It is unnecessary for shops to be fitted with multiple pro-
prietary MNO systems as the proposed solution offers
flexible multi-MNOs service to customers.
3) Pre-storage of secret keys within the SE-SIM and the use
of public key infrastructure minimise key distribution
worries, and customer signatures ensure the authenticity
and consent of purchase (i.e. non-repudiation).
4) Payment information (PI) is protected from being ma-
nipulated by the shop POS.
5) Customers do not need to bring additional ID or payment
cards as the endorsed registration means that the handset
can prove its authenticity and also that of the customer
(if the transaction PIN option is used).
6) In general the solution offers a more reliant and widely
recognised user registration process for mobile phone
access to services.
Disadvantages: As well as the advantages mentioned above,
there are also potential weaknesses that need further discus-
sion.
1) With the current style of CDC card, an external contact
smart card reader or a cradle is needed during endorsed
registration. This is likely to limit registration to a trusted
environment such as an MNO shop or government
office, although it is probable that a contactless CDC
interface will eventually be supported.
2) The payment process has been presented as on-line,
although it is known that there are arguments for off-
line support [3]. The endorsed credentials (which are at
the core of the proposal) are considered equally valid
for off-line use although there would be greater reliance
on the attack resistance and integrity of the POS units.
The credentials could also be used in a different kind of
on-line transaction in which the customer scans his own
purchases and transacts directly with the MNO over the
cellular network.
3) A customer’s MSISDN (phone number) is sent back
in clear to the MNO for customer identification via
the shop POS during a payment transaction. Although,
phone numbers are not regarded as the most confidential
of information when compared to secret keys for exam-
ple, there is still a privacy concern that phone numbers
could be linked with customer purchasing habits.
4) The speed and ease-of-use of a transaction system
will determine whether it is successful. The proposed
solution requires a number of cryptographic processes
including PKI functions, which may stretch the capabili-
ties of limited resource devices such as security elements
and mobile phones. A detailed performance analysis is
planned as follow-on work.
5) The protocol uses PKI key-pairs for both encryption
and signing purposes. Strictly speaking this does not
follow best practice advice of using a key-pair for one
purpose only, however this is also true of other major
and widespread solutions such as credit card EMV chip
and PIN transactions. Further key-pairs could be added,
although this may have a practical impact on key storage
and management.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the binding of NFC mobile
phone security technologies with the user identity security
of the CDC card that is backed by a strong user registration
process. The binding is achieved by an endorsed registration
phase that cryptographically binds the PKI credentials of the
CDC card and NFC phone in a way that is then nationally
recognised. The credentials can then be used for in-store
payment transactions to provide authentication, integrity and
non repudiation, and without the user needing to carry any
payment or ID cards. The solution, which is applicable to
multiple MNOs, has a number of interesting features, although
the implementation performance requires further investigation
and this is currently the subject of a follow-on study.
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